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Most academics and practitioners with whom I have discussed the 
result in Skilling v. United States believe that it is a sensible decision.1  
That is, the Supreme Court did the best it could to limit the reach of 
18 U.S.C. § 1346, which all nine justices apparently believed—
correctly—was, on its face, unconstitutionally vague.2  My friends 
reason that the Court had already tried once, in McNally v. United 
States,3 to force Congress to “speak more clearly than it has”4 in de-
fining the outer limits of “honest-services”5 fraud.  Congress re-
sponded quickly and with little consideration with the supremely un-
der-defined § 1346.  In the over twenty years since the statute’s 
enactment, the Courts of Appeals have been unable to come up with 
any unified limiting principles to contain its reach.  The Skilling 
Court, evidently reluctant to again throw the matter back to Congress 
given that institution’s previous default, and not satisfied with the 
 
* Associate Dean and Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to 
thank Jessica Wash and Andrew Prodromos for their research assistance and the staff 
of this journal for their patience and understanding. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 2. See id. at 2929 (“[W]e acknowledge that Skilling’s vagueness challenge has 
force”); id. at 2931 (“Reading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive con-
duct [beyond bribery and kickbacks], we acknowledge, would raise the due process 
concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine.”); id. at 2931 n.42 (“Apprised that a 
broader reading of § 1346 could render the statute impermissibly vague, Congress, we 
believe, would have drawn the honest-services line, as we do now, at bribery and 
kickback schemes.”); id.  at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 3. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 4. Id. at 360.  
 5. Id. at 362–64. 
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Courts of Appeals’ efforts, was determined to come up with its own 
“narrowing interpretation.”6 Thus, the majority deemed it appropri-
ate to rewrite the statute to cover what it concluded was the “core” of 
the criminality the prosecutors had addressed in bringing § 1346 
cases—bribery and kickbacks.7  The Court comes up with narrowing 
constructions to avoid constitutional difficulties in many statutory in-
terpretation cases, the argument goes, and this construction is one 
that many in the academic and practice communities believe is rea-
sonable. 
My only quibble with this consensus lies in my conviction that what 
the Court did in Skilling is as patently unconstitutional as § 1346—
and that its foray into legislation is not of only academic concern.  It 
clearly accepted Congress’ delegation of law-making authority and 
essentially promulgated a new statute out of the “dog’s breakfast” 
that was pre-Skilling § 1346.8  Some would argue that this is a good 
thing from a practical, if not an orthodox separation-of-powers, point 
of view.  In what I hope will be taken as a back-handed compliment, I 
will focus on Professor Dan M. Kahan’s long-standing arguments in 
this regard.  Kahan favors administrative specification of the content 
of arguably vague criminal prohibitions, but he believes that if one 
has to choose between judicial gap-filling and congressional action, 
the former is preferable to the latter.  Kahan has argued that the 
Court ought to come clean and simply acknowledge that it has long 
been engaged in interstitial lawmaking because Congress has declined 
to legislate with any specificity and “[a] criminal code at least partially 
specified by courts is both less costly and more effective than is a code 
fully specified by Congress.”9  Even were I prepared to join Professor 
Kahan in discounting the effect of judicial law-making on normative 
commitments to the “democratic accountability, notice and other 
rule-of-law values,”10  I disagree with his conclusion about the viabil-
ity and attractiveness of this delegation of authority to federal courts 
to fill in the blanks in otherwise underspecified statutory schemes.  It 
strikes me that the history of the honest-services fraud theory, which 
 
 6. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931 n.43. 
 7. Id. at 2931. 
 8. Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251, 254 
(2010). 
 9. Dan M. Kahan, Three Conceptions of Federal Criminal-Lawmaking, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 5, 12 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan, Three Conceptions]; see also Dan M. 
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 
(1996) [hereinafter Kahan, Chevron]. 
 10. Kahan, Three Conceptions, supra note 9, at 11. 
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culminated in Skilling, presents a wonderful example of how criminal 
law ought not be made, whether viewed from an institutional, socie-
tal, or individual standpoint. 
I.  THE STATUTE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND THE 
COURT’S “LIMITING CONSTRUCTION” CONSTITUTED IMPROPER 
LEGISLATION 
All the justices concluded that § 1346, viewed on its face, was 
vague.  If a statute is unconstitutionally vague, such that it does not 
give ordinary citizens fair notice and is susceptible to arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement, what should the Court do?  The Skilling 
majority asserted that “[i]t has long been our practice . . . before strik-
ing a federal statute as impermissibly vague to consider whether the 
prescription is amenable to a limiting construction.”11  Thus, the ma-
jority contended, it “does not legislate, but instead respects the legis-
lature, by preserving a statute through a limiting interpretation.”12  
When one examines the nineteen precedents cited in support of this 
supposedly hallowed practice,13 however, its legitimacy looks a lot 
shakier than the Court lets on—at least in this context.  First, in only 
three of the nineteen cases cited did the Court directly address a 
vagueness challenge.14  In the others, the Court employed its “consti-
tutional avoidance” canon of construction to avoid potential First 
Amendment and other specific constitutional issues.  Second, only ten 
of the cases involved a challenge to a criminal statute.15  More to the 
point, in only one case hailing from 1954 did the Court actually adopt 
a limiting construction to avoid holding a criminal statute unconstitu-
tionally vague.16 In another, it found that even a judicially-created 
limiting construction could not save the vague criminal prohibition at 
issue—a prohibition that threatened First Amendment values.17 
 
 11. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2929. 
 12. Id. at 2931 n.43.  
 13. Id. at 2929 n.40. 
 14. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330–31 (1988); United States v. Harriss, 347 
U.S. 612, 618 (1954); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517 (1948); see also New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982) (overbreadth). 
 15. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United 
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942); United States ex rel Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 
366 (1909); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); United States v. Coombs, 12 
Pet. 72 (1838); see supra note 14. 
 16. See Harriss, 347 U.S. at 618.  In Boos, the Court found that the criminal stat-
ute at issue was not vague.  Boos, 485 U.S. at 332. 
 17. Winters, 333 U.S. at 518–19. 
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I think these distinctions—based on the criminal character of the 
case and the type of constitutional challenge lodged—are important 
in assessing the legitimacy of the Court’s remedy.  As the Court has 
pointed out, “[t]he standards of certainty in statutes punishing for of-
fenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction 
for enforcement,” and for very good reason.18  “[T]he first principle”19 
of criminal law—the principle of legality—outlaws the retroactive 
definition of criminal offenses. 
It is condemned because it is retroactive and also because it is judi-
cial—that is, accomplished by an institution not recognized as politi-
cally competent to define crime.  Thus, a fuller statement of the le-
gality ideal would be that it stands for the desirability in principle of 
advance legislative specification of criminal misconduct.20 
This foundational principle simply does not apply in civil cases. 
The vagueness doctrine’s “connection to [the principle of] legality 
is obvious: a law whose meaning can only be guessed at remits the ac-
tual task of defining criminal misconduct to retroactive judicial 
decisionmaking.”21  Where a statute is vague—and thus by definition 
lacks ascertainable standards to guide citizens or law enforcement in 
the administration of criminal penalties—it is difficult to conceive 
how the Court can articulate such standards without legislating.  De-
spite the Court’s inexplicable reliance on the rule of lenity in declin-
ing to include undisclosed conflicts of interest in the newly articulated 
honest-services canon, this is not a case of ambiguity.  The Court was 
not asked to elect between two equally plausible definitions of a term 
(or grammatical constructions of a phrase) embedded in otherwise 
reasonably articulated elements.  Nor was it, as in other constitutional 
avoidance cases, making a choice among reasonably defined alterna-
tives.  For example, in First Amendment overbreadth cases, the Court 
is tasked with construing a clear statute that could, if not narrowed, 
impinge on protected speech.  The Court was not, in short, asked to 
elect among two or even five alternative meanings.  Rather, it was 
tasked with electing among a wealth of alternative means of defining 
and thus limiting the reach of a statute in which none of the big three 
 
 18. Id. at 515. 
 19. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79–80 (1968).  
The legality principle is one of the most basic of the human rights identified in a myr-
iad of international treaties and declarations.   
 20. John Calvin Jeffries Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985). 
 21. Id. at 196. 
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of criminal statutes—the conduct, mens rea, and attendant circum-
stances—are defined with any particularity. 
Indeed, such were the smorgasbord of choices that required resolu-
tion to truly define the reach of this statute that even if one were to 
conclude that judicial definition of some vague statutes is permissible, 
this statute is not one that is susceptible to a reasonable narrowing in-
terpretation.22  As I have laid out at greater length elsewhere, this 
statute represents “vagueness on steroids,”23 in part because “when 
courts (let alone ordinary citizens) cannot agree on what conduct—
attended by what mental state and what attendant circumstances—
constitutes a crime, it is a vagueness trifecta.”24  The Court took these 
cases to decide three issues, although it ultimately failed to address 
them: must the government prove that it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the honest-services scheme could cause some economic or pecu-
niary harm to the victims (Black v. United States);25 must the duty to 
disclose, the violation of which constitutes the “fraud,” arise under 
state law (Weyhrauch v. United States);26 and must the defendant in-
tend to obtain private gain from the victim to whom honest-services 
are owed (Skilling).27  But these are only three of the many questions 
that have split the circuits.  Other critical questions include: what cre-
ates a duty of honest-services; what constitutes a breach of that duty; 
must a separate duty to disclose be found or is such a duty inherent in 
any case in which a duty of loyalty is found; what mental state need 
be proven and does the mental state differ, as most circuits hold, in 
public and private honest-services cases; must the government prove 
the attendant circumstances of the materiality of the breach, as well 
as the non-disclosure?28 
The Court was determined to strike out on its own and adopt a lim-
iting construction that had not occurred to any of the many courts 
struggling with this statute for the past twenty years.29  Instead of an-
 
 22. See, e.g., Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud:  A (Vague) Threat to 
Millions of Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 23 (2010). 
 23. Id. at 26. 
 24. Id. at 30. 
 25. 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010). 
 26. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 27. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 28. See O’Sullivan, supra note 22, at 31–41. 
 29. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Among all the pre-
McNally smorgasboard-offerings of varieties of honest-services fraud, not one is lim-
ited to bribery and kickbacks.  That is a dish the Court has cooked up all on its 
own.”). 
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swering the questions presented and resolving at least three circuit 
splits, then, it decided to “rule in” two categories of conduct—bribes 
and kickbacks—while eliminating a third—undisclosed conflicts of 
interest.30  On what principled basis can one argue that the Court is 
merely adopting a reasonable narrowing construction rather than 
recrafting the statute by making these novel distinctions?  The 
Court’s argument for why its holding represents the former, not the 
latter, is sloppy at best and disingenuous at worst.  It identifies bribery 
and kickbacks as the “core” honest-services precedents in the pre-
McNally period based on quotations from Courts of Appeals deci-
sions and the Solicitor General’s (“SG’s”) assertion.31  It concludes on 
this basis that Congress, in § 1346, must have intended to include at 
least these two types of offenses.32  There are any number of prob-
lems with this analysis. 
The first is a factual difficulty evident to those who have studied 
the honest-services caselaw over time.  I, at least, have seen no empir-
ical proof for the proposition that these two categories of cases pre-
dominate the pre-McNally caselaw and do not believe that this asser-
tion is necessarily correct. Justice Stevens, in his McNally dissent, 
documented the amazing variety of pre-McNally “honest-services” 
cases, demonstrating that the “intangible rights” held to be protected 
extended far beyond a right to the honest-services of public and pri-
vate employees to intangibles such as the right to honest elections and 
the right to privacy.33  In its Skilling brief, the SG cited twenty-nine 
cases involving either bribery or kickbacks, but it also identified thir-
teen cases that dealt only with undisclosed conflicts of interest.34  
When the rest of the intangible rights are added to the mix, I doubt 
whether the bribery or the kickback cases do indeed predominate as 
represented.  Certainly, if these two criteria—isolated quotations 
from Courts of Appeals decisions and the SG’s proffers—control, 
then the SG was correct that undisclosed conflicts of interest ought 
also have to have been considered core offenses, but were not.35 
 
 30. Id. at 2932. 
 31. Id. at 2930–31. 
 32. Id. at 2931. 
 33. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 363–64 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). 
 34. Brief for the United States at 42–44, nn.4–5, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 35. Indeed, in many post-Skilling decisions in which courts are required to review 
old convictions or test current indictments, courts have given many defendants relief 
on the ground that they were not charged with bribery or self-dealing or that it is im-
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A second problem is presented by the state of the pre-McNally 
caselaw and the legislative history underlying § 1346: the notion that 
the Court can look to what even the majority acknowledges was a 
mass of conflicting caselaw in the pre-McNally period and come up 
with any credible guess regarding the congressional intent in passing § 
1346 is ludicrous.36  The legislative history of § 1346 says nothing 
about which of these many intangible rights ought to be protected by 
that statute.  Indeed, § 1346 was attached, as one of thirty unrelated 
provisions, to an omnibus drug bill that was passed on the last day of 
the 100th Congress.37  The enacted language was “never referred to 
any committee of either the House or the Senate, was never the sub-
ject of any committee report from either the House or the Senate, and 
 
possible to tell whether the jury convicted on self-dealing or these other theories be-
cause juries were usually charged on self-dealing with bribery and kickbacks. See, 
e.g., United States v. Ford, 639 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Coniglio, 
417 F. App’x 146 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Jaramillo, 413 F. App’x 979 (9th Cir. 
2011); Turner v. United States, 2011 WL 3859726 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2011) (order 
granting in part motion to vacate); United States v. Lynch, 2011 WL 3862842 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 31, 2011) (order granting motion for relief); United States v. Jimenez, 2011 
WL 3652773 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2011) (order granting in part motion for acquittal); 
United States v. Panarella, 2011 WL 3273599 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2011) (coram nobis 
granted and conviction vacated); United States v. Cabrera, 804 F. Supp. 2d 1261 
(M.D. Fla. 2011); United States v. Sprouse, 2011 WL 2414322 (W.D.N.C. June 10, 
2011) (order granting motion for new trial); Stayton v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
1260 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (orders granting motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sen-
tence and granting motion to vacate conviction); United States v. Maricle, 2010 WL 
5139420 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 10, 2010) (order granting motion for acquittal and denying 
motion for new trial); Geddings v. United States, 2010 WL 2639920 (E.D.N.C. June 
29, 2010) (order granting post-conviction motion to release Geddings). 
 36. See, e.g, Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2929 (“[H]onest-services decisions preceding 
McNally were not models of clarity or consistency”).  The Second Circuit explained 
the difficulties of forging “a” meaning from the pre-McNally caselaw:  
Some circuits have implemented § 1346 by resurrecting pre-McNally law.  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit has held that “§ 1346 has restored the mail fraud 
statute to its pre-McNally scope.” . . . And the Fifth Circuit, after noting that 
“Congress could not have intended to bless each and every pre-McNally 
lower court ‘honest services’ opinion,” observed that “Congress . . . has set 
us back on a course of defining ‘honest services’”; and that Court has 
“turn[ed] to that task.” . . .  However, one of these approaches simply rein-
states the entire, dissonant body of prior circuit precedent, while the other 
invites the creation out of whole cloth of new judicial interpretations of 
“honest services”—interpretations that will undoubtedly vary from circuit 
to circuit.  The result is “a truly extraordinary statute, in which the substan-
tive force of the statute varie[s] in each judicial circuit.” 
United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (altera-
tions in original). 
 37. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 739 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jolly, J. & 
DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
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was never the subject of any floor debate reported in the Congres-
sional Record.”38  What little we can discern about Congress’ intent is 
found in snippets of post-enactment declarations stating only that the 
legislation was designed to overturn the Court’s decision in McNal-
ly.39  Therefore, all one can reasonably conclude from the record is 
that Congress intended simply to reverse McNally’s ruling that mail 
and wire fraud were confined to schemes targeted at property inter-
ests.  Any assertion that it thereby ruled “in” or “out” any particular 
theory of intangible rights is pure fiction.  The Court’s own analysis 
demonstrates the unlikelihood that Congress intended to limit the 
statute in the way the Court identified.  The majority notes that brib-
ery and kickbacks have accepted meanings, citing two federal statutes 
that explicitly outlaw such conduct.40  If Congress intended to crimi-
nalize only these two categories of cases, the Court’s own cites 
demonstrate that Congress knew how to do so, and it did not. 
My final problem is a conceptual one that may be best illustrated 
by reference to a hypothetical.  Consider a statute that proscribes 
“any bad act.”  This prohibition, like the prohibition on “honest-
services” fraud, does not identify any particular conduct, mens rea, or 
attendant circumstances.  It may cover such varied activities as mur-
der, improperly parking in a handicapped zone, financial fraud, or 
fishing without a license.  Were the Court to conclude, rightfully, that 
this statute is unconstitutionally vague, could the Court—consistent 
with its duty to interpret, not legislate—identify a limiting construc-
tion whereby the statute applies only to improperly parking in a 
handicapped zone and fishing without a license?  I assume that most 
people will agree that this would be patent, and silly, “law-making.”  
To say that Congress “must have” intended to endorse prosecutions 
of “at least” bribery and kickbacks is like saying that a prohibition on 
“any bad act” can be reduced to criminalization of fishing without a 
license. 
But, some might argue, if the Court were to limit the “bad acts” 
statute to just murder and financial fraud, that would be alright be-
cause those are also obviously wrongful acts that anyone should know 
are criminal.  Even leaving aside, for the moment, notice issues, I 
 
 38. Id. at 742.  
 39. See id. at 743 (stating that Congress intended to “reinstate” the pre-McNally 
case law “without change” when it enacted § 1346); id. at 742 (quoting 134 Cong. 
Rec. H11108-01 (Oct. 21, 1988), with Rep. Conyers stating that the section 
“restor[ed] the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally 
decision” and that “[n]o other change in the law [was] intended”). 
 40. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933–34. 
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cannot see the sense in this argument.  This vague prohibition could 
also proscribe rape and robbery, which are wrongful.  Why is it any 
less “legislation” to pick these two out of the range of possible malum 
in se choices than it is to identify fishing without a license or improp-
erly parking in a handicapped zone as the limits of the statute?  In 
Skilling, for example, the Court adopted a limiting construction that 
rules “in” bribery and kickbacks, but rules “out” acting on undis-
closed conflicts of interest for personal gain.  The latter category of 
honest-services cases have been very common—indeed, many courts 
have identified this type of offense, with bribery and kickbacks, as 
among the “core” of honest-services prosecutions.41 
My more practical friends would argue that this is the best result 
our system can yield under the circumstances. Congress has had forty 
years to identify what it means by honest-services fraud with particu-
larity, and has declined, repeatedly, to do so.  In such circumstances, 
the Court is justified in stepping in to remedy this congressional de-
fault and identify two areas that everyone agrees ought to be covered.  
I believe, however, that this “sensible” resolution is not only patently 
unconstitutional law-making on the Court’s part, but it also has very 
real deleterious consequences that are largely ignored. 
II.  “HONEST-SERVICES” FRAUD AS AN OBJECT LESSON IN WHY 
CONGRESS OUGHT TO BE CHARGED WITH DEFINING THE SCOPE 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 
When Congress passes vague statutes such as § 1346, it is effective-
ly delegating law-making power to the judiciary.42  By doing so, Con-
gress maximizes its ability to make law in spite of resource and time 
constraints.43  The constraints operating on Congress include the “dif-
ficulty of generating consensus on politically charged issues, which 
can easily stifle controversial legislation. . . .  One way to escape the 
political heat on such questions is to enact highly general or vague 
statutory language, which spares members of Congress from having to 
 
 41. See, for example, United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 690 (3d Cir. 2002), 
where the  court explained:   
Honest services fraud typically occurs in two scenarios: (1) bribery, where a 
legislator was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2) failure to dis-
close a conflict of interest resulting in personal gain.” United States v. 
Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 262, 2001 U.S.App. LEXIS 25318, at *45 (3d Cir. 
2001); see also United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 54-55 (1st Cir. 
1998). 
 42. See Kahan, Three Conceptions, supra note 9, at 11.  
 43. Id. at 10. 
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take definitive stands that could disappoint powerful constituen-
cies.”44  Delegation also permits Congress to maximize its ability to 
satisfy the demands of important constituencies for legislation; the 
time and effort that otherwise would be spent consumed in the details 
of criminal statutes can be directed to more politically productive ar-
eas.45 
Apart from constitutional separation-of-powers, rule of law, and 
notice quibbles, why might we conclude that it is not necessarily a bad 
thing for the Court to attempt to arrive at “sensible” solutions to the 
problem of underspecified criminal prohibitions?  Professor Kahan 
has argued as follows: 
The cost-savings of delegated common-lawmaking stem from the 
generative character of open-textured statutory norms. When treat-
ed as a delegation of lawmaking authority . . . the criminal fraud 
statutes, and like offenses spawn scores of distinct prohibitions. To 
achieve the same result without implied delegation, Congress would 
have to bear the high practical and political costs of specifying each 
of these prohibitions itself. Courts can also update the criminal code 
more rapidly than can Congress.46 
Delegated common-lawmaking not only reduces the cost of federal 
criminal law but it is also improves its quality. Congress, which nec-
essarily makes rules in anticipation of future cases, lacks full infor-
mation about how these rules will operate in the real world. Courts, 
in contrast, perform their delegated lawmaking function in the 
course of deciding actual cases. Consequently, they see more com-
pletely how statutes interact with real-world circumstances and with 
each other and can use this information to fashion rules of law that 
fully implement legislative goals and that avoid unforeseen conflicts 
with other values and policies.47 
Concerns about democratic legitimacy, Kahan argues, should not 
trouble us when courts adopt readings of statutes that reflect a broad 
societal consensus—such as one that bars trading guns for drugs.48  
The same is true of notice concerns. Kahan argues, in essence, that 
where the Court extends a statute to cover otherwise “wrongful” 
conduct, defendants have no equitable claim to our sympathy.  Courts 
only need demand greater specification from Congress when the stat-
 
 44. Id. at 9–10. 
 45. Id. at 10. 
 46. Id. at 12. 
 47. Id. at 12–13. 
 48. Id. at 13. 
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ute at issue tests “the border between socially desirable and socially 
undesirable conduct.”49 
My own take is diametrically opposed to that staked out by Profes-
sor Kahan, especially regarding the virtues of judicial law-making in 
honest-services cases.  Our first, and perhaps greatest, disagreement 
concerns the appropriate scope and function of federal criminal law.  
As an empirical matter, no useful purpose is served by easing Con-
gress’ ability to enact yet more open-textured federal criminal laws. 
“[T]he federal ‘code’ contains a profusion of laws so complex and 
sprawling that the laws susceptible to criminal sanction cannot even 
be counted.”50  A recent estimate that there are more than 4000 fed-
eral crimes does not take into account the estimated tens of thou-
sands of federal regulations that can be criminally enforced.51  Most 
commentators bemoan not only the accelerating52 
“overcriminalization” phenomenon,53 but also the degree to which 
Congress has “federalized” crimes that traditionally were left to state 
law.54  In such circumstances, the last thing we should be doing is ena-
bling Congress’ profligate tendencies by permitting it to legislate in 
 
 49. Id. at 14. 
 50. Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” is a Disgrace: Obstruction 
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 648 (2006). 
 51. Id. at 649. 
 52. “Whatever the exact number of crimes that comprise today’s ‘federal criminal 
law,’ it is clear that the amount of individual citizen behavior now potentially subject 
to federal criminal control has increased in astonishing proportions in the last few 
decades.” TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW at 10 (1998), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice 
/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf.  
The ABA Task Force’s research revealed that “[m]ore than 40% of the federal crim-
inal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since 1970. Id. at 7.  
This “explosive” growth has “continued unabated.” JOHN S. BAKER, JR., THE FED-
ERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW & PUB. POLICY STUDIES, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE 
GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 8 (2004), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/measuring-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crime-
legislation.  Indeed, the number of statutory provisions susceptible to criminal en-
forcement has increased by one-third since 1980. Id.  
 53. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: the Politics of Crime, 54 AM. 
U. L. REV. 541 (2005).  Professor Erik Luna has pointed out that this one phenome-
non actually comprises a number of problems: “(1) untenable offenses; (2) superflu-
ous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdic-
tional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or 
pretextual enforcement of petty violations.”  Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005). 
 54. See Luna, supra note 53, at 708. 
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general terms, confident that courts will pick up the constitutional 
slack. 
Allowing Congress to avoid the costs—in time and political capi-
tal—of appropriate specificity, moreover, is also not a societal good.  
Certainly our constitutional structure and procedural safeguards evi-
dence a choice: that it should be difficult to enact criminal legislation 
and it should be difficult to subject individuals to criminal sanction.  
Where a sufficiently strong consensus does not exist to move Con-
gress and the President to agree to criminalize identified conduct, it 
ought not be criminalized. 
Political actors should be required to make political choices before 
exposing individuals to jail time or worse.  Judges not only lack the 
democratic legitimacy to do so, but they also may lack any awareness 
that the issue they are addressing actually contains policy trade-offs.  
For example, Kahan notes that efforts “to specify what or who consti-
tuted ‘organized crime’ in RICO . . . provoked strong opposition by 
organized labor, civil libertarians, and other interest groups.”55  In all 
the time I have written about and taught RICO, the threat this con-
tested legal definition might pose to labor never crossed my radar 
screen.  I assume that judges are similarly unaware of the political and 
policy trade-offs inherent in the statutory questions presented to 
them.  They are trained to believe that such trade-offs should general-
ly be irrelevant to their jobs. 
My second principal disagreement with the above analysis concerns 
the assessment that judges will produce better, more up-to-date crim-
inal statutes if they accept congressional invitations to flesh out the 
specifics of vague prohibitions.  Quite simply, the common law meth-
od of adjudication does not lend itself to effective legislation. 
Judges hear principally from two stakeholders: the defense and the 
prosecution. In a perfect world, defense counsel will try to move 
judges to adopt a more defense-favorable (i.e., limited) construction 
of applicable statutory prohibitions.  But defense counsel have an eth-
ical obligation to do their best for one client at a time, in one case at a 
time.  Their focus is necessarily narrow and exclusive.  Unless the 
views of others will serve the interests of their clients, counsel are un-
likely to solicit or share with the court the perspectives of those who 
may be affected by the legislation. For example, defense counsel 
would generally have no time or incentive to solicit labor or civil lib-
ertarians to weigh in on the proper construction of the term “orga-
 
 55. Kahan, Three Conceptions, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
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nized crime,” even if the court were willing to entertain the views of 
such amici. 
Federal prosecutors, who share an obligation to “do justice” as well 
as to represent zealously the government in each particular case, can 
take a longer view, litigating over time to achieve pre-determined pol-
icy goals.  But again, the Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) perspective 
is narrow and partial.  It, too, is unlikely to be concerned about bring-
ing to the court’s attention the varied interests of those who may have 
a stake in the outcome.  Congress, then, is likely—if it actually con-
siders the legislation on the merits before passage—to have a better 
sense of the “right” policy choice given all the competing interests 
implicated or at least will be able to claim democratic legitimacy in 
reconciling competing political druthers. 
Some argue that courts have the benefit of seeing the statute ap-
plied in the “real world,” so that judges’ decisions about the scope of 
a statute are likely to be based on actual experience, not projections.  
This, too, is questionable.  Judges only see what prosecutors charge; it 
is the DOJ, not judges, who will determine if, when, and how issues 
will be presented to courts for determination.  Strategic choices may 
be made, for example, to bring the more palatable but legally ques-
tionable cases for initial determination and, once judges have signed 
on, then to proceed with cases that are factually less sympathetic.  
Further, many cases come before the Court simply as guilty pleas—
indeed upwards of 95% of federal criminal cases are concluded by 
plea.56  And these cases of course receive the most minimal judicial 
scrutiny other than a quick allocution under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11.  In the overwhelming majority of cases, then, the de-
fendant has concluded for whatever reason to take the plea, and the 
Court is never asked to rule on the legitimacy of the prosecution’s 
theory of fraud.57 
 
 56. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS FIGURE C (2010), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_statistics/Annual_ 
Reports_and_sourcebooks/2010/SBTOC10.htm.  Plea rates in federal courts have 
remained in the 95%–97% range for a decade or more. See, e.g., id. (96.8% guilty 
pleas in 2010, 96.3% in 2009, and 95.7% in 2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 
2003 ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2003), http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_statistics/Annual_ 
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2003/ch5-2003.PDF (95.7% guilty pleas in 2003). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 2011 WL 3862842, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 
2011) (citing two cases in which defendants took guilty pleas under theories that were 
subsequently invalidated in Skilling.)  The court concluded that “both defendants 
were convicted of conduct that is no longer a crime and that, as a result, they are enti-
tled to collateral relief.” Id. at *8. 
O’SULLIVAN_CHRISTENSEN 5/10/2012  12:41 PM 
356 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
Judges are like the proverbial blind monks examining the ele-
phant—they each see only a fragment of the picture because what 
comes before them is necessarily random and happenstantial.  Trial 
judges only have this immediate connection with cases in their court-
rooms.  And on appeal, where much of the definitive assessment is 
made of the reach of the statute, the government has a huge ad-
vantage.  On appeal of a conviction, the appeals court must construe 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and must 
affirm unless no reasonable jury could have concluded on the evi-
dence that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  And 
although I cannot prove it, I believe based on my anecdotal experi-
ence that appellate judges are extremely reluctant to overturn jury 
verdicts on the facts or the law—and will go to great lengths, even 
when dealing with legal issues, to resolve them in favor of retaining 
the jury’s guilty verdict. 
If efficiency is what is prized, then common law adjudication is a 
terrible way of proceeding.  Take the honest-services doctrine.  The 
original mail fraud provision, enacted in 1872, was amended in 1909 
to create a disjunctive prohibition—that is, using the mails to perpe-
trate “any scheme or artifice to defraud” or “for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
or promises.”58  The government started bringing “intangible” rights 
prosecutions, arguing that given the statutory disjunction between the 
“schemes to defraud” and “money or property” clauses, the former 
must have been intended to vindicate non-property rights.59  Starting 
in 1941, the “Courts of Appeals, one after the other, agreed, inter-
preting the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ to include depriva-
tions not only of money or property, but also of intangible rights.”60 
The problem was that the decisions of the Courts of Appeals were, 
to put it mildly, “not models of clarity or consistency.”61  The Su-
preme Court ignored the “considerable disarray”62 below until its de-
cision in McNally v. United States in 1987—that is, for forty-six 
years.63  In McNally, the Court held that despite forty-six years of un-
broken Courts of Appeals opinions upholding various versions of 
honest-services fraud, it was not in fact a crime because mail and wire 
 
 58. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010). 
 59. Id. at 2926. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 2929. 
 62. Id. 
 63. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
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fraud were confined to schemes to defraud victims of money, not in-
tangible non-property rights.64 
Congress responded by enacting, the following year, a statute (§ 
1346) that defined the term “scheme or artifice to defraud” for pur-
poses of mail and wire (and other) frauds to include a scheme to “de-
prive another of the intangible right of honest-services.”65  The Courts 
of Appeals, faced with this un-illuminating prohibition, spent decades 
trying to ascertain the meaning of § 1346, with widely divergent re-
sults.66  The circuits split on the mens rea, actus reus, and attendant 
circumstances necessary to prove this crime. It was only after twenty-
two years of conflicting decisions in all the Courts of Appeals that the 
Supreme Court decided Skilling.67  And in that case, the Court did not 
address the three circuit splits that apparently warranted its interven-
tion, coming up with a novel theory of its own for defining the scope 
of the statute.68  Not unexpectedly, this has generated yet more litiga-
tion below as lower courts attempt to apply the Court’s holding. 
The Court’s evident decision to let circuit splits again “percolate,” 
this time for twenty-plus years, indicates a truly shocking lack of 
awareness that these are splits about the meaning of criminal statutes 
that are supposedly only legitimate if reasonably facially clear.  To 
countenance splits on their fundamental elements for decades is to 
accept that our supposed commitment to fair notice and non-
retroactive definitions of criminal sanctions is a patently empty one.  
Perhaps equally discouraging is the institutional arrogance—and 
waste—inherent in the Court’s willingness to ignore the distilled wis-
dom of years of lower court efforts.  The Court was apparently taken 
with amicus briefs that proposed a novel rule stating that § 1346 
should be defined as confined to bribery and kickbacks and, without 
more, decided to adopt that rule.69  The problem, of course, is painful-
ly evident in the Court’s own cites to code sections in which Congress 
defined “bribery” and “kickbacks.” Congress clearly knew how to 
outlaw such behavior and did not do so in § 1346. 
What is truly infuriating about all this are the practical costs that 
are so comprehensively ignored.  Yes, if the law is in a real sense in-
accessible, people cannot make the rational calculation necessary for 
 
 64. Id. at 360. 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2011). 
 66. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2927. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 2933. 
 69. Id. at 2907.  
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effective deterrence.  Yes, a code that does not give fair notice will 
undermine faith in the criminal justice system as a whole, and under-
cut the moral stigma upon which the credibility of the system must 
rest.  These abstractions ought to carry great weight.  But the ultimate 
value protected by the legality principle and attendant interpretive 
doctrines is nothing short of the value of individual freedom. 
No one can put a price on that, and it may seem simply an ideal to 
some.  But surely everyone should understand and appreciate the 
cumulative misery visited upon suspects and defendants over the last 
sixty-eight years as courts have attempted to figure out what honest-
services fraud does and does not cover.  Hundreds if not thousands of 
individuals have been subjected to investigations and prosecutions 
and jail time for conduct that we know, only after the Court belatedly 
ruled in McNally and now Skilling, was not in fact criminal. 
These investigations and trials are humiliating and often financially 
disastrous: homes lost and savings ravaged.  Such prosecutions are in-
evitably highly stressful: they can tear apart families and traumatize 
the defendant’s children.  The defendants usually lose their jobs and, 
not infrequently, their livelihood by virtue of the stigma and collateral 
consequences of a conviction.  The defendant can, under the federal 
sentencing guidelines, be subjected to long prison terms.70  Given the 
length of these terms, many of them will not qualify for the so-called 
“Club Feds,” but rather will serve their time in “real” prisons often 
located far from family and friends. It is cold comfort to these de-
fendants—and should be a real scandal—that the Supreme Court, 
years after their convictions, can say that we were all wrong in believ-
ing that the statute covered such conduct.  As Professor Andrew 
Leipold explains: 
[A] factually innocent defendant confronts the problem of being 
publicly accused by the government of criminal behavior with no re-
al prospect of ever being officially vindicated [as “innocent” rather 
than simply “not guilty”]. An innocent suspect may have the charges 
dismissed or may be acquitted, but the sequella of an indictment 
may leave the defendant’s reputation, personal relationships, and 
ability to earn a living so badly damaged that he may never be able 
to return to the life he knew before being accused. More subtly, a 
person who was once charged with a crime is put on a different (and 
far less desirable) track in the legal system than someone who has 
 
 70. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 5, Pt. A (2011), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_5.pdf.  
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never been arrested. A later acquittal or dismissal does surprisingly 
little to relieve an innocent defendant of the resulting burdens.71 
“Oops, sorry,” or “better late than never” obviously does not cut it.  
“This is the way the system works, imperfect as it is” should not do ei-
ther because this is not the way the system should or has to be.  First, 
the Court should not have allowed sixty-eight years to elapse during 
which the scope of the doctrine was uncertain.  Second, the Court 
should have thrown this obviously vague statute right back into Con-
gress’ lap.  Perhaps if the Court did so more often, instead of trying to 
“fix” deficient statutes, Congress would get the message that it must 
define criminal conduct at least to let citizens know what conduct, at-
tended by what mens rea and attendant circumstances, can subject 
them to criminal prosecution and stigma.  And it apparently is possi-
ble to draft a decent statute, including one that defines intangible 
rights.72 
Some might argue that what many of the defendants in these cases 
did was “wrong” even if not expressly proscribed by criminal law.  
Thus, they would point to those who manipulated an undisclosed con-
flict of interest for personal gain—that is, those whose conduct the 
Skilling Court decreed does not fall within the honest-services prohi-
bition.  These were cases in which the prosecutor, jury, and judges all 
agreed that what the defendant did was criminally reprehensible.  
Apparently the view would be that these folks should have known 
that what they did was “wrong.”  I have heard this argument, implicit-
ly or explicitly, from many folks.  In such circumstances, we need lose 
little sleep over the improper prosecutions of people who were moral-
ly, if not legally, guilty. 
 
 71. Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2000); see also United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 
(3d Cir. 1979) (“[W]hile in theory a trial provides a defendant with a full opportunity 
to contest and disprove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an in-
dictment will often have a devastating personal and professional impact that a later 
dismissal or acquittal can never undo.”); In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458–59 (2d Cir. 
1947) (“[A] wrongful indictment is no laughing matter; often it works a grievous, ir-
reparable injury to the person indicted.  The stigma cannot be easily erased.  In the 
public mind, the blot on a man’s escutcheon, resulting from such a public accusation 
of wrongdoing, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Fre-
quently, the public remembers the accusation, and still suspects guilt, even after an 
acquittal.”). 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that a 
provision of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was not 
void for vagueness where it stated that labor organization officials occupy positions 
of trust within such organizations and are trusted by their members as a group, and 
specified the duties the officials owed to the union and members they serve.). 
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The problems with this argument are many.  First, it rests on the 
unsustainable assumption that we can agree on who has acted “im-
morally”—by no means a given in our diverse society—and the naïve 
assumption that the government will apply a usefully vague statute 
only to pursue such “immoral” people.  Neither assumption is, in my 
view, provable.  Second, from an institutional point of view, this con-
tention is contrary to the foundations of our system of constitutional 
criminal justice.  Our system of government makes it difficult for the 
executive to deprive any citizen of his or her liberty. I hardly need to 
recite the complete litany: the defendant is presumed innocent; the 
government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and the defendant is entitled to due process in a fair and impartial 
public trial with the assistance of counsel and the benefit of a right 
against compelled self-incrimination.  All of this is designed to allow 
the average citizen to operate securely in the knowledge that he is 
free to act as he wishes unless he steps over a clearly defined legal, 
not moral, line.  There are many other social means by which those 
who cross moral lines can be held to account.  Prosecutions are, and 
should be, reserved for those who cause criminal harm. 
To contend that that line ought to depend, instead, on prosecutors’ 
views of the “morality” of a defendant’s actions is a repudiation of the 
framers’ wisdom.  And it is downright scary to those of us who do not 
believe men are angels, and who recognize our own fallibility. 
